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Dr. Joseph A. Indaimo, Perth, West Australia / Australia  
 
Human Rights and the Law: the Unbreachable Gap between the Ethics of 
Justice and the Efficacy of Law 
 
Abstract:  This  paper  explores  the  structure  of  justice  as  the  condition  of  ethical,  inter-subjective 
responsibility. Taking a Levinasian perspective, this is a responsibility borne by the individual subject in a 
pre-foundational, proto-social proximity with the other human subject, which takes precedence over the 
interests of the self.  From this specific post-humanist perspective, human rights are not the restrictive 
rights of individual self-will, as expressed in our contemporary legal human rights discourse.  Rights do 
not amount to the prioritisation of the so-called politico-legal equality of the individual citizen-subject 
animated  by  the  universality  of  the  dignity  of  autonomous,  reasoned  intentionality.    Rather,  rights 
enlivened by proximity invert this discourse and signify, first and foremost, rights for the other, with the 
ethical burden of responsibility towards the other.  
Keywords: human rights, identity and being, postmodernity, ethics, Levinas 
 
The discourse of modern human rights revolves around two fundamental fulcrums – the identity 
of self (the philosophical question of what it is ‘to be’ human) and the nature and extent of legal 
rights attached to such an identity.  Too often, however, in the discourse of human rights there is 
an assumption regarding questions of the former in order to focus on issues surrounding the 
latter.    This  is  unfortunate  as  it  leads  to  a  marginalisation  of  questions  of  being  within  the 
discourse of rights.  But these questions are important for the degree to which we understand the 
former necessarily impacts upon the limits and content of the latter.  In my work on ethics, 
postmodernity and rights I wish to return to a focus on questions of being and how the changing 
nature  of  our  concept  of  being  –  particularly  through  the  influences  of  contemporary 
postmodenity – impacts upon the efficacy of modern human rights law.   
 
The  assumed  identity  of  being  within  modern  human  rights  stems  from  the  historical 
discourse of Western liberal humanism.  It is a particular Anglo-French tradition – informed by 
(to name a few) thinkers such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau – with the important, influential 
augmentation  from  other  German  thinkers  such  as  Fichte  and  Kant.    In  many  cases,  our 
contemporary  human  rights’  discourse  is  labelled  Kantian  or  neo-Kantian,  underscoring  the   2 
 
discourse’s  focus  on  the  atomised  individual  of  moral  potentia.
1  This  is  the  individual 
legitimised  in  the  Enlightenment  –  an  individual  marked  by  the  newly  discovered 
essential/inherent traits  of autonomous will  and reasoned consciousness.  Good conscience  – 
what is right – stems from the exercise of such traits.  This is the image of the self-determined, 
self-sovereigned individual, exercising these essential traits for their own (reasoned and willed) 
ends. This is the image of the ego-I, for which such traits and markers of moral potentia and good 
conscience  exist  prior  to  the  sociality  of  the  collective  –  they  exist  within  the  limits  of  the 
capacity (the self-sovereign power) of the autonomous individual, first-and-foremost, free from 
community. 
 
It is this (assumed) image of the individual which sits at the heart of modern human rights.  
The  very  founding  document  of  contemporary  rights  –  the  1948,  United  Nations’  Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights – rests upon the notion of (the image of) the ‘inherent and equal 
dignity’  of  all  human  beings  ‘endowed  with  reason  and  conscience.’
2  The  universality  (the 
equality) of such traits underscores the ‘dignity’ of humanity and ensures the universality of this 
identity of being, which in turn, ensures the universality (the equality) of rights attached to such 
an  individual.
3  This  universality  and  equality  facilitates  a  ‘sociality  of  the  Same’  –  a 
homogeneity of/in the collective identity beyond ‘distinctions of any kind, such as race, colour, 
sex, language, etc.’
4  In other words, our contemporary human rights’ discourse begins with the 
self-interested individual and then expands this image of self into a sociality of coincidental 
others of equal traits and capacities (powers) of self-interest and, hence, rights – imagining a 
(potentially utopian) community of the Same individual character, possessing the same individual 
rights. 
 
The relationship between this concept of the nature of being and the limits of our human 
rights is seen in the quality of such rights.  This concept/focus of/upon ‘I’ leads to a particular 
subjective characteristic of rights within our modern human rights’ discourse.  Such rights are 
                                                           
1 For just a couple of examples of both a history of the idea of human rights and their neo-Kantian flavour, refer to: 
Costas Douzinas, The End of Human Rights: Critical Legal Thought at the Turn of the Century, 2000; Gary Herbert, 
A Philosophical History of Rights, 2002. 
2 Refer to The United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (1948), Preamble & Article One. 
3 Charles Taylor. ‘Condition of an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights.’  The East Asia Challenge for Human 
Rights, 1999, 124-144, 124; See Douzinas, (note 1), 319; Zygmunt Bauman, Postmodern Ethics, 1993, 26. 
4 Refer to The United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, (1948), Article Two.   3 
 
possessive, individualistic and subjective right, which are owned (like personal property) and 
exercised by the individual (all individual’s equally) personally.
5  They are ontological rights – 
signifying the individual’s autonomous capacity to control, possess and propel itself, to have 
rights of and over its own potency and powers, its own means to being.
6  These are rights which 
reflect the innate dignity in each of us to justify ethical considerations (good conscience) from the 
point of view of each autonomously reasoned and willed individual.
7  Such a conception of 
human rights is the very signification of the potentiality and potency of selfhood  –  of  self-
actualisation, immune from external affectivity.
8  To this extent, such personal rights lead to a 
law of rights which aim to ensure the social space for the moral potential in/of each autonomous 
individual, free from interference and intrusion from the State and the collective which the State 
represents.  Human  rights  law  becomes,  first -and-foremost,  the  protection  of  self -directed 
individuals against the State/collective; it takes on a hue which prioritises individual political and 
civil rights (aimed against the State) above other aims and notions of rights (social, economic, 
etc). 
 
This image of human identity and this characteristic of modern human rights is not a 
reflection of a ‘universal truth’ of the nature of being and its rights.  Rather, it is the consequence 
of a certain historical contingency in Western Europe which facilitated the West’s evolution from 
the  ancien  régimes  organised  around  King  and  Church  (the  Ancient  Empires  and  Medieval 
Europe) and towards the modern (enlightened) democratic State.
9  In this evolution in the West, 
human rights law – with its focus on the civil and political rights of the individual – comes to 
mediate between the new, modern State and this newly conceptualised image of the individual.  
The task of this law, first-and-foremost, is to draw a protective line around the individual over 
which the State/collective cannot step in the name of personal freedom and individual (socio-
political) liberty.  In this way, such an image of human rights has been of central importance to 
the significant advances in modern society.   
 
                                                           
5 B. Roth, ‘Retrieving Marx for the Human Rights Project.’  Leiden Journal of International Law, 2004, 51-52; J. 
Gordon, ‘The Concept of Human Rights: The History and Meaning of its Politicization.’  Brooke Journal of 
International Law, 1997-1998, 721-28.   
6 See Taylor, (note 3) 2.   
7 See Roth, (note 5) 52-53. 
8 B. Kunstler, ‘Beyond the Illusion of Human Rights.’  Journal for Pedagogy, Pluralism and Practice, Fall 1999, 
(www.lesley.edu/journals/jppp/4/kunstler), accessed 20/10/2007, 7.   
9 Refer to both Douzinas’ and Herbert’s account on the history of human rights, (note 1).   4 
 
  And yet, such a focus on the individual and its subjective rights has led to tension between 
the individual and the collective of other individuals.  This is seen in a number of ways.  For 
example, when one individual’s exercise of their rights clashes against another individual (or the 
collective) of the same equal rights (for example, when one freedom of speech clashes against 
another’s  freedom  of  speech).  Or  –  on  a  global  level  –  when  one  Nation-State  claims  its 
sovereignty  as  a  defence  for  its  actions  within  its  own  borders  against  the  well-intentioned 
intervention from the global collective of other Nation-States. At these moments human rights 
law becomes uncomfortably ambiguous and confusingly opaque.  At these moments the efficacy 
of human rights law is awkwardly compromised by a clash of ‘right versus right’ of sovereign 
individuality. 
 
This focus on the selfhood of the individual, and the subsequent tension between it and the 
collective, has been critiqued on many fronts.  Historical figures such as Burke, Bentham and 
Marx have raised concerns over such a focus.
10  Contemporary cultural relativists also question 
such a tradition and its focus on individual selfhood as does the debate/tension between the 
‘generation  of  rights’  within  our  contemporary  human  rights’  discourse.    And  there  is  even 
critique  of  such  a  focus  on  selfhood  from  Hegel  and  neo-Hegelians  such  as  Adorno.
11  My 
interests lie in the late twenty and early twenty first century discourse of postmodernism and its 
re-imagining of human identity.  Whereas the above tr adition in the concept of the self within 
modern human rights commences with and focuses upon an image of being anchored within the 
realm of the ego-I, postmodern philosophy deliberately commences with the notion of the ‘other.’  
This  is  the  marginalised  other  de-prioritised  in  established  and  dominant  meta-narratives  of 
socio-political,  ideological  and  cultural  discourses.  Postmodernity  necessarily  begins  with  an 
acceptance  (and  a  prioritisation)  of  this  other  –  that  which  defies  the  intimacy  of  the  self, 
undermines its certainty and intrudes upon the sovereignty of individual conscious capacity and 
intentional/reasoned will. The alterity of otherness – the very quality of otherness – is that which 
is always already beyond the circle of the Same in the exercise (the effort) of existence of the 
self. The other defies the reduction of all into one, homogenous, symmetrical sociality.   
 
                                                           
10 E. Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France, 1971; J. Bentham, The Works of Jeremy, 1843. 
11 G. Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 1967; G. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, 1977; M Horkheimer & T. Adorno, 
Dialectic of the Enlightenment, 1969.   5 
 
My interest here is in how such a shift in the image of identity must necessarily lead to a re-
imaging  of  human  rights,  which  are  dependent  upon  notions  of  human  identity.  For 
postmodernism there are many others which are potentially threatened by marginalisation and 
reduction:  the  gendered  other;  the  sexual  orientation  of  the  other;  the  ethnic  other;  the 
unconscious other; the linguistic and symbolic other.  The socio-political postmodern projects of 
identity politics have led to the important expansion of the equality of rights – the established 
individual  rights  as  outlined  above  –  to  such  differing  social  groups.    That  is,  such  ‘other 
individuals’ and individual groups gain (through socio-political agitation) an equal protection of 
the law against the (arbitrary) intrusion of the State.  Yet at the same time postmodenity can too 
easily  lead  to  a  (often  criticised)  superficiality  of  the  self.    Postmodern  subjective  agency 
supplants  modernism’s  individual  sovereignty  and  rights  too  easily  become  an  exercise  in 
subjective aesthetics, what Foucault refers to as ‘the creation of ourselves as a work of art.’
12  In 
this  context,  we  have  reached  the  potential  postmodern  plight  of  human  rights
13  –  in  which 
human rights are confused with subjective demands in the potentially infinite processes of the 
objectification  and  commodification  of  self.  Rights  become  the  vehicle/the  mechanism  to 
express/signify ‘my-self’ as ‘I’ choose, free from State/collective interference.  Rights (particular 
in  the  West)  become  subsumed  within  our  contemporary  moral  crisis  of  self-interested 
indifference,  ethical  ambivalence  and  personal  relativism.
14  The contemporary (postmodern) 
confusion  here  in  our  rights’  discourse  is  that  with  the  (modern)  focus  on  the  autonomous 
individual, there is a blurring of the line between the private individual/subject and the public 
citizen.  The public square aimed at the collective good has become the arena for private agendas 
engaged in individual interests.  This postmodern outcome, of course, only goes to exacerbate the 
problematic tension between individual and collective. 
 
For postmodernism’s important contributions to our understanding of human identity to be 
taken seriously (particularly in the human rights discourse) it must offer more than the identity 
politics aimed at the politico-legal equality of the relativism of the multiplicity of subjective self 
                                                           
12 Michel Foucault, ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Works in Progress.’  The Foucault Reader, 1984,  
351. 
13  See Douzinas (note 1), 1. 
14 M. Sarup, An Introduction to Post-Structuralism and Postmodernism, 1993, 24 & 107; see also Bauman, (note 2), 
16-21.  This, of course, is not a consequence of postmodernism itself.  Too often the critiques of postmodernism fail 
to realise that postmodernism itself is the consequential conclusion of modernism.  Postmodern equivocations of/in 
the multiplicity (the relativism) of subjective positioning are the corollary of liberal humanism’s focus on 
autonomous individual sovereignty over itself as its own end.     6 
 
identity.  For  postmodernism  to  contribute  to  the  easing  of  tension  between  individual  and 
collective it must speak to an ethical sociality beyond a simple equality of politico-legal rights for 
‘other  subjective,  individual  selves’.    If  now  through  the  work  of  postmodernism  there  is  a 
discourse of the primacy of the other within the philosophy of being, then within the human 
rights discourse we must re-prioritise talk about a ‘responsibility-towards-the-other’ above the 
‘rights-of-self.’  This shift in the nature of human rights is not new within the discourse of our 
contemporary rights.  Since the formal establishment of modern rights post WWII, there has been 
an ongoing debate regarding the individual’s responsibilities (above their rights) to the collective.  
For example, this debate arises from the point-of-view of cultural relativism (for example the 
arguments surrounding Asian and Muslim values) and from the point-of-view of the second and 
third generations of rights,
15 which focus on social and economic rights of the collective.  There 
is also the 1950s work of T.H. Marhsall and his argument that the individual citizen of the new 
democratic  State  is  only  complete  when  it  includes  characteristics  of  both  individual 
rights/protections which are also mediated with more expansive social responsibilities.
16  For me, 
my interests lie in the ethical implications of the nature of rights when viewed through the notion 
of postmodern otherness.  And in this task I turn to the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and his 
understanding of an ethical primacy between the subject and the other above the interests of the 
self and the politico-legal discourse of protected self-interest.   
 
Levinas is radical not for his insistence on there being a prior inter-subjectivity between the 
self and the other – between one individual and another individual – which comes before the 
autonomous self.  Thinkers such as Rousseau, Marx and Hegel already referred to such an inter-
subjectivity. Rather, Levinas’ radicalness stems from his insistence that such an inter-subjectivity 
is,  first-and-foremost,  an  asymmetrical  ethical  responsibility  for  the  difference  (the  alterity) 
between self/other, rather than an equality of politico-legal rights amongst individuals who are 
the same.  For Levinas, ethics is ‘first philosophy’ because it is this inter-subjective (inter-human) 
ethical  responsibility  which  animates  all  other  human  activities.
17  It  is  this  ethic  of  a 
responsibility-for-the-other (for each other) which is the foundation, the measure and the aim of 
the sociality, the politics, the law and the rights of humanity. This is what turns our contemporary 
                                                           
15 Refer to The United Nations’ generations of rights: The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and the Declaration on the Right to Development respectively. 
16 Refer to T.H. Marshall, &  T. Bottomore, Citizenship and Social Class, 1992. 
17 Emmanuel Levinas, Totality & Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority, 1996, 304.   7 
 
human  rights  law  on  its  head  –  for  it  pulls  the  focus  of  rights  away  from  the  autonomous 
(rational) powers of individual sovereignty/agency and towards a ‘right of responsibility’ each 
individual bears towards the inter-human collectivity of distinct others.   
 
Levinas finds this primary ethical inter-humanness in the anterior neighbourhood of what he 
terms the ‘proximity with the face’ of the other.
18  This is the ethical foundations of human 
identity upon which social justice arises and towards which the law – the politco-legal discourses 
and machinations and specifically human rights law – are motivated to serve.  This relationship 
between the self and other occurs pre-ontological, there is a pre-conscious split in the subject,
19 in 
which the other always already is before and above me and in which the self is always already 
opening and aiming towards the calling of  the other.  Hence, for Levinas, there is a prevenient 
openness of (ethical) responsibility in the very fabric of human identity; an asymmetrical debt of 
consideration the self inherently owes towards the other.  This is because the self is always 
already in community: always already incarnate with others; always already in dialogue and 
discourse with the faces of others.  For Levinas, it is the ethical quality of this inter -human 
engagement with alterity (with the otherness of the other) which marks us  – which interpellates 
the subject – as ‘human’ and not some other experience of being. 
 
For the critics of Levinas, it is perhaps too easy to dismiss such ethics as too personal and 
too  subjective,  something  from  which  Levinas  never  resiles.  Yet,  such  criticisms  ignore  the 
intervention of another – of the readings of Derrida – in the works of Levinas, which draw out in 
Levinas  a  sociality  of  ethico-political  justice  from  the  singularly  infinite  nature  of  personal, 
ethical responsibility found within the proximity with the face.
20  This is done through Levinas’s 
insistence of the ‘third  party’  – the sociality of all others/all  humanity  – which  also  always 
already  resides  in  this  neighbourhood  of  proximity  between  self  and  other.
21  Hence, 
                                                           
18 See Levinas, (note 17), 187-253. 
19 As opposed to the traditional Kantian (liberal humanist) split subject (the subject of our contemporary human 
rights’ discourse) which is ontologically whole in its own conscious capacities of reason and will and then split 
‘from’ its social self (the private individual and the public citizen) – what Marx terms the terrestrial life of the private 
individual and the celestial life of the communal/political being.  Refer to Karl Marx, ‘On the Jewish Question.’ The 
Marx-Engels Reader, 1978. 
20 It is commonly suggested that Levinas’ second great intellectual work, Otherwise than Being, is a revision of 
Totality and Infinity in response to Derrida’s reading of Levinas’ earlier work.  Refer to J. Derrida, ‘Force of Law: 
the Mystical Foundation of Authority.’  Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice, 1992; and J. Derrida, Violence 
and Metaphysics, Writing and Difference, 1978. 
21 Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise Than Being or Beyond Essence, 1998.   8 
 
simultaneously, personal ethics becomes social justice and decisions and calculations must be 
made regarding responsibility to all and not only one intimate neighbour or (more traditionally) 
in the service of the individual self.  Justice becomes the ‘taking into account’ of the many within 
which we are in proximity.   
 
Hence, with the third party active in the neighbourhood of proximity, society, law and the 
socio-political are not formed around the limits of a coincidence of equal autonomous individuals 
of rationalised self-intention, mediated by a reasoned law of a restricted State (that is, restricted 
by the human rights of the individual).  Rather, prior to this sociality of equal individual reason 
and will there is already an ethical founding – an ethical animation – in the sense of being and in 
the structure of human identity.  Put simply, prior to a political, economical or cultural sociality 
(prior to the human rights of the individual) there is always already an ethical sociality between 
the self, the other and all others, from which everything else emerges.  The significant corollary 
from this Levinasian position is that the structure of law, society and justice are pre-configured 
within an ethical openness (rather than limited within the margins of individual legal rights and 
obligations) and the subject personally engaged in a prevenient responsibility for-the-other (rather 
than  pre-occupied  by  the  sovereignty  of  self).    To  this  extent  reason  is  not  the  conscious 
calculation  in  service  of  what  can  best  serve  my  own  self-interests,  but  rather,  is  the 
rationalisation of how responsibility can best be distributed amongst a collective of distinct others 
separate from me.  Radically here, ethical, inter-human responsibility is an irrational concept – it 
forces us to go against the self-service of the ego-I in order to meet a more profound and pre-
foundational sentiment ingrained in the fabric of human identity – the consideration of/for the 
other.   
 
This  ethical  sociality  of  responsibility  and  consideration  ‘above/before’  the  individual’s 
rights of self-interest may cause discomfort for more traditional liberal humanists.  But unlike the 
anti-humanist  aims  of  many  postmodern/post-structuralist  projects  (think  of  Foucault  and 
Leotard), Levinas’ aim is not to defeat the image of the autonomous, individual of conscious 
capacities and reasoned will (as articulated within our contemporary human rights’ discourse).  
Rather,  Levinas’  project  is  more  post-humanist/critical-humanist,  aiming  at  reinforcing  the 
subject with personal, ethical integrity beyond the ego-I’s concern for it-self.  His aim is not to 
defeat the ontology of being, but rather, to underscore its effort of existence with an ethical   9 
 
humility, balancing the acts of the ego-I with the considerations of the ethical-I.  His aim is to 
justify the existence and energies of the subject with the ethical  considerations and integrity 
always already held within its very own energies of being and acts of existence.   
 
This prevenient, ethical inter-human relationship between the self, the other and the many 
others of the third party leads us to a further novelty in Levinas’s pre-foundational sociality of 
ethical proximity.  Within such a prevenient ethical relationship, the uniqueness of the self is not 
directed by the determinates of self-consciousness and intentional will in the sovereignty of self 
over self.  That is, the traditional moral potentia of the individual as working itself as ‘its own 
ends’ is not what makes each of us distinct and unique.  Rather, the uniqueness of the subject 
rests upon the personal, ethical, response – respons-ability – of the subject to the other.  The 
novelty and transformative potential of this Levinasian post-modern ethic is that freedom and 
justice are not found in the potential of the ego-I’s self-promoting enate powers of being.  Rather, 
freedom and justice are found in the escape from the limits of being and from the potential 
violence in the reduction of others in the exercise of being.
22  This is an escape/a freedom into the 
consideration of some-thing other, beyond my individual existence and understanding, beyond 
my own insecurities and anxieties for my own self-existence. 
 
Hence, society founded upon this ‘first philosophy of ethics’ speaks to the proximity of 
alterity, speaks to a pre-configured consideration of/for distinction.  To achieve this, Levinas 
acknowledges  the  potentiality  of  modern  democracy  and  the  openness  of  contestation  which 
resides at the centre of the modern democratic State.  And this is why our contemporary human 
rights  discourse,  with  its  focus  on  civil  and  political  rights,  is  so  significant.    But  for  post-
humanists  such  as  Levinas,  Bauman  and  perhaps  even  Derrida  and  Critchley  there  is  never 
enough democracy because there is never the certitude of alterity (of the other) within the space 
of being (of the individual).  Democracy must always be engaged in the effort of vigilance, must 
always be a dialogue of doubt to ensure that it does not concretise into ‘the past of what it has 
become and what it has achieved’ and thereby closing itself to the infinite possibilities of the 
distinctions beyond what it is (in itself) to be.
23  If alterity – the very otherness of the other – is 
                                                           
22 See Levinas, (note 17), 200. 
23 A. Loumansky, ‘Levinas and the Possibility of Justice.’  Liverpool Law Review, 2006, 156; Simon Critchely, 
Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity, 1999, 188-247; Drucella Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit, 1992, 110-150; Derrida, 
(note 20), Force of Law, 61.   10 
 
always beyond the sameness of the self, then the self, society, law (human rights law) and politics 
must always be open to the possibilities of distinction and rupture.  This is Levinas’ ‘good state’ 
– a State aware of the weight and limits of its own being.  Thus, politico-legal actions and efforts 
must necessarily always fail.
24  The good state is a State in ‘permanent revolution’.  Law aims 
towards justice and justice signifies an ethical trait of human identity which leaves the experience 
of being always already open to responsibility-for-the-other.  The law cannot satisfy itself with 
the measure of its own limits.  Justice resides outside the law to inspire the law to always engage 
in the effort of going beyond itself, doubt itself, critique itself, push itself to ‘always do better’ in 
the name of justice and in the service of our ethical relations.   
 
In this light, human rights law must always strive to do better as well.  One of the dangers in 
our contemporary human rights’ discourse is in its own structural certitude – in its own self-
importance  underscored  by  its  claim  to  a  ‘universal  truth’  regarding  human  identity,  which 
(within the discourse itself) is rarely questioned, critiqued or contested.  But human rights law 
must do more than simply be certain.  It must also always exert the energy to consider what it has 
left out and must always be flexible to change in order to re-consider the nature of itself in 
response  (responsibility)  to  distinctions  outside  itself.    The  efficacy  of  human  rights  is  not 
measured by the completeness of its universality.  Rather, it is measured by its ongoing concern 
for the distinction of alterity, by its never-ending responsibility towards, and in the collective of, 
all others.  This is not an action of accepting difference for the sake of difference.  Such an action 
all too easily allows for a localised totalitarianism which marginalises and excludes at the local 
(small group) level.  This, unfortunately, is something the arguments for cultural relativism often 
defend in the name of ‘difference.’  Rather, human rights law ought to consider (ought to include) 
the ethical conduct in the effort of selfhood which mitigates, first-and-foremost, the violence of 
reduction and exclusion on all levels – in personal engagement with others and then on a large 
social (international) scale.  This energy of constant consideration in rights’ law to ‘strive for 
more’ than it already is, is not a stretch towards more individual politico-legal rights (as seen in 
the West since the late twentieth century).  Rather, in the endless interplay between the efficacy 
of law and the ethics of justice, human rights act as the provocateur of the law, of society and of 
the individual.  Without denying the necessity of modern democratic politico-legal rights, human 
                                                           
24 Levinas, (note 21) 160; E. Levinas, Entre Nous: Thinking of the Other, 1998, 167.   11 
 
rights necessarily speak to the ethical integrity of human identity and to the social responsibility 
we all have for-the-other (all others).   
 
To be satisfied with a prescriptive set of civil and political rights and duties – to be left in a 
collective of symmetrical sociality of politics and law (the legal equality of all citizen subjects) – 
leaves us within the limits of being and in the struggle of/for the autonomous space of individual 
being amongst the collective.  This leads us back to the promotion of self-interest and self-care as 
the primary goal of rights.  Rather, human rights should agitate a moral conscious – not of/for 
self as currently in the image of human identity within our contemporary human rights – but of 
our ethical relations and social duties to others. This is the transformative potential in Levinasian, 
post-humanist ethics to move from a focus on individual free will to a condition of good will.
25  It 
runs parallel to Marshall’s evolution of the citizen subject from one with civil and political rights 
alone focussed on individual freedoms, to one animated within rights of social justice, focussed 
on the collective.
26  In both  cases, both thinkers are suggesting that we as human beings and 
rights as human rights are not fully realised until each begins to open to the sociality of 
responsibility for others that we share as a collective community.   
 
In Levinas’ work there is a reminiscence of a pre-modern sentimentality – a ‘kind of’ natural 
law (though Levinas and other post-humanists do not use such a language) prior to man made 
law.    This  post-humanist  natural  law  is  the  ethical  law  which  attempts  to  limit  the  ego-I’s 
exercise of being and struggle for self.  This is the ethical law of an anterior, ulterior, openness in 
the  very  structure  of  human  identity,  which  attempts  to  prohibit  the  violence  of  ontological 
reduction in the presence and in the struggle of self existence.  But there is a great difference 
between post-humanism and pre-modernity. Levinas is not denying freedoms (the autonomy and 
liberty)  won  by  the  modern  individual,  but  rather,  attempts  to  supplement  it  with  a  pre-
foundational epoch of human sentiment – what he terms the hitherside of the (ethical) otherwise-
than-being of human identity.
27 It is this ethical hitherside of self which, Levinas tells us, ‘cramps 
the self in its own skin.’
28  The difference (pre-modern v postmodern) is toward which direction 
our (personal) ethical duty/responsibility lay.  For in pre-modernity, obligation and responsibility 
                                                           
25 Levinas, (note 17), 200. 
26 Though Levinas would still place the sociality of the self, the other and all others prior to the individual. 
27 Emmanuel Levinas, Substitution, Basic Philosophical Writings, 1996, 86. 
28 Levinas, (note 27), 86.   12 
 
are to social and cultural structures and institutions (King and Church), which close us from 
personal engagement with the uniqueness of the alterity of others.  But for post-humanist/critical 
humanist ethics there is a personal, one-on-one relation between self and other – and the third 
party of all others – unmediated by a cultural foil.   
 
This  personal  relationship  is  the  attempted  balance  in  post-humanist  ethics  which  was 
missing  in  pre-modern  structures:  a  balance  of  individual  autonomy  while  still  giving 
consideration  towards  an  ethical  sociality  –  a  collectivity  of  prevenient  inter-subjective 
responsibility and consideration.  This is a balance that is perhaps (at best) de-prioritised within 
our contemporary human rights’ discourse and its historical, philosophical tradition regarding the 
nature of being.  In the epoch of the modern individual moral potentia is measured by the extent 
reason and will is exerted towards the prioritised atomised self-interest.  Hence the importance in 
the human rights discourse to continue to ask questions regarding the philosophy of being, rather 
than  be  solely  consumed  by  politico-legal  issues  and  the  machinations  of  politico-legal 
institutions.  For Levinas, this balance is expressed in his concept of the ‘hard/soft command’ of 
this  ‘ethics  of  alterity.’
29  Without  the  strength  of  enforced  pre-modern  hierarchical  social 
structures,  contemporary  (post)modern  ethical  relations  between  people  are  ‘softly  spoken.’  
Hence, while the prevenience of the ethical relationship of proximity between self and other 
obliges the individual to make an ethical choice (the hardness of ethic’s demand) it cannot oblige 
us as to how we choose to respond (how we exercise our respons-ability).  Thus, how each of us 
chooses (even the choice of saying ‘no’ and rejecting our responsibility) is still a decision for 
individual agency (the softness of the ethical demand).  In the complexity and ambiguity of this 
hard/soft  character  of  ethical  obligation,  of  the  inter-human  balance  between  individual  and 
collective, of the variance amongst right and responsibility, human rights law must do more than 
prioritise a unifocal focus on simple individual agency.  Rather, from a Levinasian post-humanist 
perspective, the priority in human rights ought to be the ethical obligation of making ethical 
choices in the first place.   
 
   
                                                           
29 R. Burggraeve, The Wisdom of Love in the Service of Love: Emmanuel Levinas on Justice, Peace and Human 
Rights, 2002, 98.   13 
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